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ABSTRACT Education is often found to be a strong determinant of ethnic prejudice. However,
there is preliminary evidence that this educational effect varies across countries. Moreover,
there are also theoretical arguments to expect cross-national variances in the educational effect
on ethnic prejudice. From both a cultural and structural perspective, we set out to explain these
cross-national variances in the educational effect. Results of multilevel analyses on data
from 11 European countries show that the cultural perspective is more fruitful to explain
cross-national variances in the strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice than the
structural perspective: a country’s democratic tradition and degree of religious heterogeneity are
important for the strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice, whereas a country’s
ethnic composition and unemployment rate are less relevant.
Keywords: education; ethnic prejudice; cross-national comparisons
INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, in reaction to Nazi racism, many researchers have tried to
explore and explain ethnic prejudice (Myrdal, 1944; Adorno et al., 1950; Allport,
1954). From the early days on, education has proven to be one of the strongest
determinants of white Americans’ ethnic prejudice. This relationship is one of
the most consistent  ndings in the  eld of inter-ethnic relations (Schuman et al.,
1997; Vogt, 1997): higher educated individuals turn out to be less prejudiced
against ethnic minorities than lower educated individuals. Moreover, this educa-
tional effect remains strong, even after controlling for numerous other individual
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characteristics, such as social class, age, etc. This consistent effect has predomi-
nantly been interpreted as the universal liberalizing effect of education: the educa-
tional system was considered to be the most important socializing agent to transmit
liberal values in order to reduce ethnic intolerance and ethnic prejudice (Selznick &
Steinberg, 1969; Hyman & Wright, 1979).
This educational effect on ethnic prejudice has not only been found among
white Americans, but also among native Europeans. In several European countries,
where research on inter-ethnic relations became more and more important due to
increasing numbers of ethnic minorities, a strong negative association between
education and ethnic prejudice has been established (Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989;
Jenssen & Engesbak, 1994; Knudsen, 1995; Wagner & Zick, 1995; Pedersen, 1996;
Coenders, 2001). However, some cross-national studies, mostly dealing with Eu-
ropean countries, brought into question the presumed universality of the liberalizing
effect of education, since it turned out that in some countries, education was only
a moderate determinant of ethnic prejudice or tolerance (see for example Muller et
al., 1980; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1980; Weil, 1982, 1985; McIntosh et
al., 1995; Billiet et al. 1996) [1]. Thus, these studies suggest that there are
cross-national variances in the strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice.
There are also theoretical arguments to expect cross-national variances in the
educational effect. First, from a cultural perspective, education can be considered to
re ect the degree of exposure to the educational system. If we assume that in
different countries different values may be transmitted through the educational
system (cf. Weil, 1985; Jenssen & Engesbak, 1994), then it is likely that there will
be cross-national variances in the strength of the educational effect on ethnic
prejudice. Second, as we look at education from a structural perspective, we can
consider education as an indicator of social status, i.e. education refers to one’s
position in society. Then, if we assume that there may be cross-national variances in
the extent to which people feel their position to be threatened by ethnic minorities
(cf. Jackman & Muha, 1984), and since ethnic prejudice has been shown to be a
response to these perceived threats (cf. Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002), it is
likely that there will be cross-national variances in the educational effect on ethnic
prejudice.
Previous cross-national studies on the relationship between education and
ethnic prejudice or tolerance suffered from several de ciencies. Some studies were
carried out in a small set of countries (Weil, 1982, 1985; McIntosh et al., 1995) and
some contained incomparable measurements (Weil, 1982, 1985). Furthermore,
some studies did not attempt to explain variances in the strength of the educational
effect (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1980), whereas other studies did not test
these explanations systematically at the country level (Muller, 1980; Weil, 1982,
1985; McIntosh et al., 1995; Coenders, 2001). Moreover, these explanations only
considered education from a cultural perspective.
In this contribution we will deal with these de ciencies. We are able to do so,
since:  rst of all, we have data on many different European countries, i.e. on both
western democracies and former state socialist countries; second, these data were
collected in a comparable way, containing comparable measurements (Jagodzinski &
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Dobbelaere, 1999); third, we set out to systematically test whether there are
cross-national variances in the strength of the educational effect. Finally, we will test
explanations for these cross-national variances in line with the distinction between
the cultural and structural perspective on education.
EDUCATION AND ETHNIC PREJUDICE FROM A CULTURAL PERSPEC-
TIVE
First, we will consider education as the degree of exposure to an important
socializing agent, i.e. the educational system, in which pupils are taught the domi-
nant norms of society (see for example Dreeben, 1968; Selznick & Steinberg, 1969;
Hyman & Wright, 1979). Moreover, we assume that the higher one’s education, the
longer one has been exposed to society’s dominant norms and the more one has
internalized society’s dominant norms (cf. Selznick & Steinberg, 1969; Collins,
1971).
Without doubt, there are cross-national variances in the dominant norms of
society (Inglehart, 1990; Halman, 1991), since these depend on a country’s histori-
cal and political tradition. Moreover, the values that are transmitted by a country’s
educational system re ect the political culture of that country, since, according to
socialization theory, a country’s communal leaders determine to a certain degree
which norms and values are transmitted at school [2]. Furthermore, which norms
and values are actually transmitted may depend on country characteristics, in
particular a country’s democratic tradition and religious heterogeneity (Weil, 1985).
Democratic Tradition
Weil (1985) mentioned a country’s democratic tradition as an explanatory factor for
cross-national variances in the strength of the relationship between education and
prejudice. Since tolerance for other (religious or ethnic) groups is a very important
feature of a democratic society, it is to be expected that in countries with a
longstanding democratic tradition, people have been exposed to these tolerant
values at school. The higher one’s education, the longer one has been exposed to
these tolerant values and, therefore, the effect of education on ethnic prejudice will
be relatively strong in longstanding democracies. In contrast, in countries with an
interrupted democratic tradition (such as Italy and Portugal) [3] democratic values
have been taught for a shorter period of time at school. In these countries it is not
a matter of course that democratic values are transmitted at school, as in longstand-
ing democracies. Due to the interruption in democracy, democratic values may have
been neglected at school, at least for some time. Furthermore, when democracy was
restored it may have taken some time before the in uence of former totalitarian
regimes on the educational system was erased. Due to less or a shorter lived
exposure to liberal values, the educational effect on ethnic prejudice will be weaker
in interrupted democracies.
Moreover, we expect that the effect of education on ethnic prejudice will be
even weaker in former state socialist societies, since former state socialist leaders
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denied social or ethnic cleavages. Former state socialist societies were, at least to
some extent, designed to be homogeneous in social and ethnic terms (Dawisha,
1990; Tismaneanu, 1992). With the socialist revolution, educational systems in state
socialist societies became crucial agents of socialization with the declared aim of
educating the ‘new man’ and of reshaping and strengthening a new socio-economic
order (Meier, 1989). Moreover, the educational system of these countries has been
described as uniform, highly centralized and under the control of the state and the
political hegemony of the communist parties, with a considerable degree of stan-
dardization, with centrally licensed textbooks, with the purpose of highly formalized
outcomes (Meier, 1989). Therefore, we expect that the educational system in former
state socialist countries may have been less inclined to reduce ethnic prejudice. As
a consequence, there may be hardly any difference between the well educated and
the poorly educated with respect to the degree of exposure to liberal values, such as
tolerance towards other (ethnic) groups. Therefore, we expect the effect of edu-
cation on ethnic prejudice to be relatively weak in countries with a recent democratic
tradition.
In short, we assume that the higher one’s education, the longer one has been
exposed to the values that have been transmitted at school. The content of these
values depends in turn on the democratic tradition of that country. Therefore, we
expect a country’s democratic tradition to affect the strength of the educational
effect on ethnic prejudice. The effect of education on ethnic prejudice in countries
with an interrupted democratic tradition will be relatively weak compared to
countries with a longstanding democratic tradition. Moreover, in countries with a
recent democratic tradition, the effect of education on ethnic prejudice will be even
weaker.
Religious Heterogeneity
Weil (1985) also mentioned a country’s religious heterogeneity as a determinant of
cross-national variances in the strength of the educational effect. He suggested that
particularly in religiously heterogeneous societies, communal leaders may try to
promote accommodation between segments of the population and set out to
decrease intergroup tensions in order to preserve social cohesion (see for example
Lijphart, 1977). In order to achieve this, communal leaders may try to transmit an
ideology of accommodation to the educational system that is, in turn, more likely to
instill tolerant attitudes and thereby reduce intergroup tensions. In contrast, in
religiously homogeneous countries, the need to reduce intergroup tensions may be
relatively small, due to the absence of serious religious cleavages. Therefore, commu-
nal leaders of these countries may not feel a strong need to promote tolerance. As
a consequence, less attention will be paid to tolerance and respect for other (ethnic)
groups at school. We argue that a country’s degree of religious heterogeneity affects
the educational effect on ethnic prejudice: the more religiously heterogeneous a
country is, the stronger the educational effect on ethnic prejudice will be.
Contrary to the above mentioned assumption, there is another branch of
theories from which a contradictory hypothesis can be deduced. According to
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religious competition theory, the religious market is assumed to be like any other
economic market: the more suppliers, the more competition (Stark & Iannaccone,
1994). From this line of reasoning it follows that the more heterogeneous, and hence
competitive, the religious economy of a country is, the more ‘investments’ will be
made by religious organizations, i.e. denominations, to establish and preserve a
market share. As in commercial economies, this can be achieved by means of
advertising: our religious product is better than the product of other denominations
(cf. Stark & Bainbridge, 1987, pp. 44–49). In countries with a high level of religious
heterogeneity or competition, religious leaders are more inclined to promote their
religion as the only true religion. As a consequence, in highly religiously heteroge-
neous or competitive countries, the educational effect will be weakened by religious
heterogeneity. Based on this line of reasoning, it can be expected that the more
religiously heterogeneous a country is, the weaker the educational effect on ethnic
prejudice will be.
EDUCATION AND ETHNIC PREJUDICE FROM A STRUCTURAL PER-
SPECTIVE
Education may also be considered as an indicator of social status, i.e. it refers to
one’s position in society. Those individuals who are well educated have more chance
of obtaining a high status job and of earning a fair income; in short, the better
educated enjoy an advantaged position in society compared to the poorly educated
(Blau & Duncan, 1967; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). Moreover, there is a relationship
between one’s position in society and ethnic prejudice and this relationship may vary
across countries, as explained by theories of ethnic competition.
Ethnic Competition
According to ethnic competition theory (Coser, 1956; Blalock, 1967; LeVine &
Campbell, 1972; Olzak, 1992), social (or ethnic) groups compete for scarce re-
sources (e.g. in the labour or housing market).The level of competition one experi-
ences, either at the individual or at the contextual level, will affect one’s level of
ethnic prejudice [4]. However, since we are interested in cross-national variances in
the educational effect on ethnic prejudice, we will focus on the contextual level. At
the contextual level, actual ethnic competition for scarce resources, will rise if (i) an
increasing number of people from different ethnic groups compete for, ceteris
paribus, the same amount of scarce resources or (ii) or a decreasing amount of scarce
resources are competed for by, ceteris paribus, the same number of people from
different ethnic groups (cf. Coenders & Scheepers, 1998).This implies that even if
there is no shortage of scarce resources but the relative number of people making up
ethnic minorities is very high, people may perceive ethnic minorities as a threat to
their socio-economic well-being. On the other hand, if the economic conditions are
not very prosperous, i.e. if the rate of unemployment is high, but the relative number
of people from ethnic minority groups is relatively low, then these ethnic minorities
may also be considered to be a threat.
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Particularly in highly competitive conditions, those with the least resources (the
poorly educated) are more likely to perceive ethnic minorities as a threat than those
with more resources (the well educated) (Quillian, 1995). As a consequence, the less
educated will be more inclined to ethnic prejudice than the well educated. More-
over, if the actual situation is not that competitive, those with the least resources will
not perceive that much threat and, therefore, their ethnic prejudice will not differ
sharply from those with more resources. In short, the more ethnic competition there
is in a country, i.e. the higher the rate of unemployment or the higher the percentage
of ethnic minorities, the stronger the educational effect on ethnic prejudice in that
country will be.
DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
We tested our hypotheses with data stemming from the cross-national survey
Religious and Moral Pluralism (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere, 1999). These data have
been collected using face-to-face interviews with people aged 18 years and older in
11 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy,
The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Sweden) in 1998. The data are
well suited to our purposes because they contain valid, detailed and cross-national
comparable measures on ethnic prejudice and education. In each country the sample
was drawn according to a multi-stage random design (for more information see
Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere, 1999). Since we are interested in the level of ethnic
prejudice of the native born people, we only included them in the analyses.
Ethnic Prejudice
Ethnic prejudice is measured by presenting the following three items to respondents:
‘Immigrants are no less intelligent than the [nationals]’, ‘Immigrants are no less
trustworthy than the [nationals]’ and ‘Immigrants are no less hard-working than the
[nationals]’. Respondents indicated on seven point scales to what extent they agreed
or disagreed with these items (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). In the
introduction to the items, respondents were referred to particular groups of immi-
grants that were particularly visible and relevant in their country. Although this is a
valid way to solve problems of cross-national comparisons, we cannot rule out the
possibility that between-country differences are due to the presence of different
immigrant groups in the respective countries. This type of Likert measurement is
one of the most frequently employed procedures in this line of research, considered
to provide valid and reliable information (cf. Quillian 1995; Billiet et al., 1996).
Tests for reliability, contained in Table I, show Cronbach a values ranging between
0.54 in Poland to 0.78 in Finland. The overall reliability, computed on the pooled
sample, is satisfactory (0.71). By computing the mean of the answers to these three
questions, a scale has been constructed. Thereafter, we computed means and
standard deviations for the scale to obtain a glimpse of cross-country differences,
again contained in Table I. It appears that some countries are rather high on ethnic
prejudice, like Hungary, Poland, Italy and Belgium, whereas countries like Sweden
and Denmark are rather low in this respect.
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TABLE I. Reliability of the scale for ethnic prejudice (Cronbach’s a values) and description of ethnic
prejudice and education in 11 European countries
Ethnic prejudicea Educationb
Cronbach’s a Mean SD Mean SD n
Belgium 0.60 3.11 1.40 3.02 1.20 1633
Denmark 0.71 2.45 1.31 2.65 1.44 586
Finland 0.78 3.05 1.43 2.83 1.25 757
Great Britain 0.76 2.71 1.32 3.09 0.78 1332
Hungary 0.73 3.94 1.52 2.02 1.37 956
Italy 0.79 3.22 1.59 2.54 1.20 2135
The Netherlands 0.59 2.58 1.24 3.32 0.86 981
Norway 0.73 2.53 1.31 2.29 1.18 480
Poland 0.54 3.56 1.34 2.13 1.14 1118
Portugal 0.58 2.88 1.37 2.17 1.21 956
Sweden 0.66 2.21 1.16 3.05 1.28 970
All countries 0.71 3.00 1.46 2.71 1.24 11,904
aEthnic prejudice (seven point scale):
(1) immigrants are no less intelligent than the [nationals]; (2) immigrants are no less trustworthy than the
[nationals]; (3) immigrants are no less hard-working than the [nationals].
bEducation consists of  ve categories:
(1) (in)complete primary; (2) incomplete secondary; (3) secondary completed; (4) incomplete university;
(5) university completed.
Education
To measure education, we used information on the highest level of education
completed by respondents. A cross-national comparative categorization has been
used, ranging from (1) (in)complete primary, (2) incomplete secondary, (3) second-
ary completed, (4) university incomplete to (5) university degree completed. In
Table I the means and standard deviations for education have been computed for
each country, to obtain a glimpse of cross-national differences.
Other Individual Characteristics
Differences between social classes were previously found to be important in the
explanation of ethnic prejudice, therefore, we included employment as a control
variable. We distinguish between the categories employed (the reference category),
self-employed, unemployed, retired and other people not active in the labour force
(e.g. housewives/househusbands and students). Unfortunately, the data do not allow
a distinction between different social classes based on their actual position in the
labour force (except for the self-employed class). Another important measure of
socio-economic position, i.e. income, cannot be used, as it is not available for the
four Scandinavian countries. In this data set religiosity is measured in a detailed way,
however, we will make use of the most direct or conventional indicator, namely
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respondents’ church attendance. The measurement of church attendance is a
straightforward question on the frequency of church attendance, ranging from never
to several times a week. To ascertain the curvilinearity of the effect of church
attendance on prejudice, we included both the  rst and the second order power of
church attendance in the equation, as prescribed by Berry and Feldman (1985) to
detect non-linearity [5]. As other control variables we included straightforward
measures of gender (0 5 female, 1 5 male) and age (18 years and older). Finally, we
added community size, measured on a scale from 1, ‘less than 500 inhabitants’, to
10, ‘more than 1 million inhabitants’.
National Characteristics
National characteristics are contained in Appendix A. We placed the countries in
one of three categories on the basis of their democratic tradition and computed
dummy variables for each of these categories, namely longstanding democracy,
interrupted democracy or recent democracy. The degree of religious heterogeneity
was measured by aggregating individual religious denominations to the country level
(derived from the Religious and Moral Pluralism data). For each country one minus
the sum of the squared proportions of the different denominations was computed.
To take the number of denominations in each country into account, this  gure was
divided by one minus the inverse of the number of categories. The religious
heterogeneity index is 0 when all citizens of a particular country are of the same
denomination. The larger the index is, the more religiously heterogeneous a country
is (i.e. the more people are evenly spread over different denominations).
For the country characteristics measuring ethnic competition we use valid
international statistics on the proportion of non-nationals and unemployment.
Figures on the number of non-nationals as a percentage of the total population were
taken from the OECD (1998) and Hagendoorn et al. (1995). Figures on unemploy-
ment were derived from the Yearbook of Labour Statistics (International Labour
Of ce, 1998).
THE BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND ETHNIC
PREJUDICE
In Table II the distribution of educational level and the average level of ethnic
prejudice in each educational category across 11 countries is presented. As can be
seen from Table II, the distribution of respondents over the educational categories
varies across countries: in Hungary, Poland and Portugal there are a relatively large
number of poorly educated respondents compared to, for example, The Netherlands
and Sweden, where a relatively large number of respondents are well educated.
As we explore the bivariate relationship between education and ethnic preju-
dice, we notice that in almost every country the least educated are the most
prejudiced, whereas the most educated are the least prejudiced. Overall, we see that
as educational level increases the level of ethnic prejudice gradually diminishes. In
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TABLE II. The percentual distribution of education, the mean ethnic prejudice for each educational level,
the deviation from linearity (F) of the relationship between educationand ethnic prejudice and the ( g ) value
of this relationship in 11 European countries
Ethnic Deviation from
Education (%) prejudice (X¯) linearity (F) g
Belgium (1) (In)complete primary 12.1 3.41
(2) (In)complete secondary 21.1 3.43
(3) Secondary completed 32.9 3.18
(4) Incomplete university 20.6 2.85
(5) University completed 13.2 2.56 2.23 0.212
Denmark (1) (In)complete primary 23.9 2.72
(2) (In)complete secondary 36.7 2.64
(3) Secondary completed 8.7 2.06
(4) Incomplete university 11.8 2.11
(5) University completed 18.9 2.14 1.74 0.212
Finland (1) (In)complete primary 19.6 3.33
(2) (In)complete secondary 14.1 3.30
(3) Secondary completed 44.4 3.04
(4) Incomplete university 7.1 2.65
(5) University completed 14.8 2.63 0.57 0.714
Great Britain (1) (In)complete primary – –
(2) (In)complete secondary 15.7 3.17
(3) Secondary completed 70.8 2.72
(4) Incomplete university 2.6 2.28
(5) University completed 11.0 2.07 0.69 0.220
Hungary (1) (In)complete primary 60.0 4.10
(2) (In)complete secondary – –
(3) Secondary completed 26.6 3.81
(4) Incomplete university 2.5 4.08
(5) University completed 10.1 3.23 3.25 0.177
Italy (1) (In)complete primary 20.7 3.76
(2) (In)complete secondary 33.2 3.36
(3) Secondary completed 26.9 3.02
(4) Incomplete university 9.6 2.56
(5) University completed 9.6 2.81 12.25a 0.233
The (1) (In)complete primary 5.8 3.47
Netherlands (2) (In)complete secondary – –
(3) Secondary completed 59.1 2.71
(4) Incomplete university 26.1 2.23
(5) University completed 9.0 2.12 2.55 0.265
Norway (1) (In)complete primary 17.3 2.58
(2) (In)complete secondary 7.3 3.05
(3) Secondary completed 45.0 2.66
(4) Incomplete university 19.6 2.22
(5) University completed 10.8 2.06 5.91a 0.203
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TABLE II. Continued
Ethnic Deviation from
Education (%) prejudice (X¯) linearity (F) g
Poland (1) (In)complete primary 30.5 3.61
(2) (In)complete secondary 46.1 3.59
(3) Secondary completed 12.4 3.63
(4) Incomplete university 2.2 3.28
(5) University completed 8.8 3.20 1.73 0.091
Portugal (1) (In)complete primary 35.1 3.15
(2) (In)complete secondary 36.0 2.93
(3) Secondary completed 14.0 2.60
(4) Incomplete university 6.7 2.36
(5) University completed 8.2 2.34 0.89 0.207
Sweden (1) (In)complete primary 19.6 2.53
(2) (In)complete secondary 3.1 1.99
(3) Secondary completed 47.6 2.30
(4) Incomplete university 12.3 1.96
(5) University completed 17.4 1.84 3.12 0.206
n 5 11,904 (-: less than 20 respondents in this category).
aP , 0.05.
most countries, except for Italy and Norway, the relationship between education
and ethnic prejudice does not deviate from linearity, as the F statistic for the
deviance from linearity is not signi cant (P , 0.05). In Italy the deviation from
linearity may be caused by the highest educational category, those who completed
university: they are slightly more prejudiced than those with an incomplete univer-
sity education. In Norway this deviation from linearity may be caused by those with
the lowest level of education, i.e. those who did not attend more than primary
school; this category is less prejudiced than those who attended and/or completed
secondary school. As these are only minor deviations, we consider the relationship
between education and ethnic prejudice to be linear since, overall, this relationship
follows the same pattern: the higher one’s education, the lower one’s ethnic preju-
dice.
Moreover, it seems that there are indeed cross-national differences in the
educational effect on ethnic prejudice, which may be derived from differences in the
g statistic. The g statistic varies from 0.091 in Poland to 0.265 in The Netherlands,
meaning that in Poland the association between education and ethnic prejudice is
rather weak, whereas this association is rather strong in The Netherlands. However,
before reaching conclusions, we will  rst test these cross-national variances in a
multivariate way.
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TABLE III. The estimation of different multilevel models to explain the educational effect on ethnic
prejudice in 11 European countries
Model –2*loglikelihood D –2*loglikelihood D df
0 Intercept 42871.34
1 0 1 random variation at country 41705.62 1165.69 1
level
2a 1 1 education 41284.94 420.68 1
2b 2a 1 random slope for education 41266.79 18.15 2
3 2b 1 individual controls 41109.44 157.35 9
4 3 1 country characteristics 41083.86 23.61 5
5 4 1 cross-level interactions 41064.14 19.58 5
MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS
The nature of these data is such that they are hierarchically structured: individuals
are nested within countries. Ignoring the fact that individuals are clustered within
countries may cause serious (technical) problems. For example, ignoring clustering
will generally cause standard errors of regression coef cients to be underestimated.
This in turn could lead to incorrect con rmation of hypotheses. Correct standard
errors will be estimated only if variation at the country level (besides variation at the
individual level) is allowed in the analysis. Multilevel modelling provides an ef cient
way of doing this (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Another advantage of multilevel
analysis is that it allows simultaneous modelling of individual level and country level
effects, as well as cross-level interactions: interactions between country characteris-
tics and effects at the individual level (in this case the effect of education on ethnic
prejudice). To estimate these multilevel models we used the software package
MLwiN (Goldstein, 1995).
MODELS
The results of the modelling procedure are displayed in Table III, which contains
goodness-of- t for the different models that explain ethnic prejudice. The goodness-
of- t of the different models is indicated by the 2 2*loglikelihood statistic, also
called the deviance. Actually, this statistic indicates lack-of- t, since the lower the
deviance, the better the  t. The deviance follows a v 2 distribution with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of parameters to be estimated.
We started by estimating a null model that includes an intercept that allows for
variation at the individual level only. Next, we allowed the intercept to vary across
individuals as well as across countries (model 1). We see that this change leads to
a large improvement in the model  t. This is indicated by a decrease in the
loglikelihood statistic of 1166 with 1 degree of freedom. This indicates that there
are not only differences between individuals’ scores on ethnic prejudice, but also
between countries’ levels of ethnic prejudice.
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Since we are primarily interested in the effect of education on ethnic prejudice,
we added the education variable in the next model (2a). The inclusion of education
improved the model signi cantly (a decrease of the loglikelihood statistic of 421 with
1 degree of freedom). This indicates that education is very important in explaining
ethnic prejudice. However, since we are interested in cross-national variances in the
educational effect, we also included a random slope for education which allows the
educational effect to vary across countries (model 2b). Once again this improved the
model signi cantly (a change of 18 in the loglikelihood statistic with 2 degrees of
freedom), indicating that the educational effect does vary across countries.
To this random slope model we added individual control variables, such as
gender, age and social position (model 3). This again improved the model’s
goodness-of- t signi cantly (a change of 157 in the loglikelihood statistic, df 5 9).
Since we hypothesized that ethnic prejudice is affected by certain country character-
istics, we added these country characteristics in the next step. We included two
dummy variables to measure democratic tradition, a religious heterogeneity index,
the unemployment rate and the percentage of non-nationals in model 4. The
inclusion of these country characteristics also led to a signi cant improvement in the
model (see Table III).
Finally, since we are interested in explaining cross-national variances in the
educational effect on ethnic prejudice, we added cross-level interactions between the
above mentioned country characteristics and the educational effect on ethnic preju-
dice (model 5). By doing so, we checked whether the strength of a country’s
educational effect is affected by certain country characteristics. These cross-level
interactions are the  nal addition to our model and improved the model’s goodness-
of- t signi cantly (a change of 20 in the loglikelihood statistic, df 5 5).
RESULTS
The results of the multilevel modelling procedure are presented in Table IV. This
table contains unstandardized parameter estimates, which are comparable with
parameters from conventional multiple regression analysis. At the bottom of the
table we present variance components, at both the individual and country levels.
The variance reduction between models is related to the explanatory power of the
models we estimated (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).
Since we are interested in explaining cross-national variances in the educational
effect and the random slope model turned out to be a signi cant improvement in the
model (see Table III), we start by describing the results for model 2b, the random
slope model. In model 2b the general effect of education on ethnic prejudice over all
countries is displayed. This general educational effect on ethnic prejudice is rather
strong ( 2 0.22) and signi cant. This means that, over all countries, the higher one’s
education, the lower one’s ethnic prejudice, exactly as we expected the effect to be.
In order to obtain the strength of the educational effect for each country separately,
we added country residuals to this general educational effect [6]. The educational
effects, computed for each country separately, are shown in Figure 1. As one can
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TABLE IV. Parameter estimates from multilevel models on ethnic prejudice in 11 European countries
(standard errors between brackets)
Model
1 2bd 3 4 5
Intercept 2.93 (0.15)c 3.55 (0.14)c 3.24 (0.16)c 1.85 (0.24)c 1.56 (0.29)b
Education 2 0.22 (0.02)c 2 0.19 (0.02)c 2 0.19 (0.03)c 2 0.05 (0.06)
Other individual characteristics
Employed (ref.)
Self-employed 0.12 (0.04)c 0.12 (0.04)c 0.12 (0.04)c
Unemployed 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06)
Pensioned 0.12 (0.04)c 0.12 (0.04)c 0.12 (0.04)
c
Other non-employed 2 0.03 (0.04) 2 0.03 (0.04) 2 0.03 (0.04)
Age 0.01 (0.00)c 0.01 (0.00)c 0.01 (0.00)c
Male 0.17 (0.03)c 0.17 (0.03)c 0.17 (0.03)c
Church attendance 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Church attendance squared 2 0.01 (0.00) 2 0.01 (0.00)a 2 0.01 (0.00)a
Community size 2 0.02 (0.01)c 2 0.02 (0.01)c 2 0.02 (0.01)c
Country characteristics
longstanding democracy (ref.)
Interrupted democracy 0.45 (0.13)c 0.55 (0.16)c
Recent democracy 0.79 (0.12)c 0.60 (0.15)c
Religious heterogeneity 1.14 (0.22)c 1.72 (0.28)c
Unemployment rate 0.06 (0.01)c 0.07 (0.02)c





3 education 2 0.05 (0.03)
Recent democracies
3 education 0.10 (0.03)c
Religious heterogeneity
3 education 2 0.31 (0.06)c
Unemployment rate
3 education 2 0.00 (0.00)
Percentage non-nationals
3 education 0.00 (0.01)
Variance components
Individual 1.94 1.87 1.84 1.84 1.84
Country 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.03 0.02
n 5 11,904.
aP , 0.10; bP , 0.05; cP , 0.01; dThis is the model with random slopes for educational attainment.
see, the strength of the educational effect varies across countries. In Great Britain
and The Netherlands the educational effect is rather strong ( 2 0.32), whereas this
effect is rather weak in Poland ( 2 0.12).
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FIG. 1. The strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice in 11 European countries. The results
are from the random slopemodel (2b).Country residuals were added to the general educational effect over
all countries; not controlled for other individual characteristics.
As we compare the variance components of models 1 and 2b, we see that
inclusion of education leads to a reduction of the initial variance at the individual
level from 1.94 to 1.87, i.e. almost 4% explained variance. Moreover, the effect of
education also explains some of the variance at the country level, since the variance
at country level decreases from 0.24 to 0.20, i.e. about 17% explained variance. This
indicates that differences in the countries’ educational compositions are relevant to
the explanation of ethnic prejudice across countries (Snijders and Bosker, 1999,
p. 218).
When we control for other individual characteristics in model 3, the strength of
the educational effect decreases slightly, but it remains a strong predictor of ethnic
prejudice and its effect is still highly signi cant. Both the self-employed and the
pensioned are more prejudiced than the employed (reference category). Age does
not have a signi cant effect on ethnic prejudice, whereas gender does have a rather
strong effect: males are more prejudiced than females. Both church attendance and
church attendance squared do not have a signi cant effect, meaning that there is no
curvilinear effect. The larger the community size, i.e. the bigger the city one lives in,
the less one is prejudiced.
In model 4 we added country characteristics, since the speci c context people
live in may affect their attitudes towards ethnic minorities and, therefore, country
characteristics may affect ethnic prejudice directly. In interrupted democracies, like
Italy, people are on average more prejudiced (0.45) than in longstanding democra-
cies. In recent democracies or former state socialism countries, like Hungary and
Poland, people are even more prejudiced (0.79). A country’s degree of religious
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heterogeneity also has a positive effect on ethnic prejudice. Overall, as one can see
in Table IV, the more religiously heterogenous a country is, the more prejudiced the
residents of that country are on average. With regard to the unemployment rate, one
can state that the higher a country’s unemployment rate, the more prejudiced the
residents of that country are. The percentage of non-nationals does not have a
signi cant effect on the overall level of a country’s ethnic prejudice. By including
country characteristics, the variance at country level changes from an initial 0.24 to
0.03. This indicates that almost 88% of the initial variance at country level is
explained.
In model 5 cross-level interactions between country characteristics and the
educational effect on ethnic prejudice are included. We checked whether these
country characteristics affect the educational effect on ethnic prejudice in order to
test our hypotheses. From the cultural perspective we expected that a country’s
democratic tradition and its degree of religious heterogeneity would affect the
strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice. We expected the educational
effect to be (i) strongest in longstanding democracies, (ii) weaker in interrupted
democracies and (iii) even weaker in recent democracies. It turns out that in
interrupted democracies the educational effect does not differ signi cantly from that
in longstanding democracies (reference category). However, in recent democracies
the educational effect is signi cantly weaker, i.e. less negative (0.10), than in
longstanding democracies. This means that we have to refute the hypothesis con-
cerning differences in the strength of the educational effect between interrupted and
longstanding democracies. However, we do not have to refute the hypothesis
regarding differences in the strength of the educational effect between recent and
longstanding democracies: in recent democracies the educational effect on ethnic
prejudice is weaker than in longstanding democracies.
With respect to a country’s degree of religious heterogeneity, we formulated two
contradictory hypotheses. First, we proposed that the higher a country’s degree of
religious heterogeneity, the stronger the effect of education would be, and, second,
from religious competition theory we expected that the higher a country’s degree of
religious heterogeneity, the weaker the educational effect would be. We found
support for the  rst hypothesis: the more religiously heterogeneous a country is, the
stronger the (negative) effect of education is ( 2 0.31).
We also formulated hypotheses pertaining the effect of a country’s actual ethnic
competition on the strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice. However,
both a country’s unemployment rate and percentage non-nationals do not affect the
strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice. Therefore, we have to refute
these hypotheses.
Finally, our full model explains the variance at country level very well. From an
initial 0.24 this variance is eventually reduced to 0.02, largely due to the inclusion
of country characteristics. This means that we have explained almost 92% of the
initial variance at the country level. However, we have to admit that we have not
explained much of the initial variance at the individual level: this is reduced from
1.94 to 1.84. This means that about 5% of the initial variance at the individual level
is explained.
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CONCLUSION
We started this contribution with the notion that education is often found to be an
important determinant of ethnic prejudice. In this study of 11 European countries
we again found that education is important in explaining variations in ethnic
prejudice. Moreover, this educational effect remains strong even if we control for
other individual characteristics. The educational effect on ethnic prejudice is often
interpreted as a universal liberalizing effect: education is supposed to reduce ethnic
prejudice in each and every context. However, we expected that this liberalizing
effect of education may not be as universal as often is assumed and may vary across
national contexts. We actually found that the effect of education on ethnic prejudice
varies signi cantly across countries.
In this contribution we have distinguished two types of explanations for cross-
national variances in the educational effect on ethnic prejudice. First, according to
a cultural perspective, we regarded education as the degree of exposure to an
important socializing agent, i.e. the educational system, in which pupils are taught
the dominant norms of society (see for example Dreeben, 1968; Selznick & Stein-
berg, 1969; Hyman & Wright, 1979). Moreover, we assumed that the higher one’s
educational level, the longer one has been exposed to society’s dominant culture and
the more one has internalized society’s dominant norms. Second, from a structural
perspective, we considered education to indicate social status, i.e. it refers to one’s
position in society. Those individuals who are well educated enjoy an advantaged
position in society compared to the poorly educated. In line with this distinction, we
distinguished two types of country characteristics that might affect the educational
effect on ethnic prejudice. We considered country characteristics that re ect which
norms and values have been transmitted at school (democratic tradition and re-
ligious heterogeneity), and second, we studied country characteristics that re ect the
actual ethnic competition in a country (unemployment rate and percentage of
non-nationals).
In recent democracies the educational effect on ethnic prejudice turns out to be
weaker (less negative) than in longstanding democracies, whereas in interrupted
democracies the educational effect is equal to the effect in longstanding democra-
cies. This last  nding is not in line with Weil’s previous  ndings (1985), as he found
that in interrupted democracies the educational effect was weaker than in longstand-
ing democracies. However, in general we found evidence to support his suggestions,
since the strength of the educational effect still varies between relatively recent and
longstanding democracies. This means that in recent democracies there is only a
slight difference between the more educated and the less educated with respect to
ethnic prejudice, whereas in longstanding democracies the more educated are
considerably less prejudiced than the less educated.
With regard to a country’s degree of religious heterogeneity, we found a strong
negative cross-level interaction, indicating that the more religiously heterogeneous a
country is, the stronger the difference between the more and the less educated with
respect to their level of ethnic prejudice, in the sense that the more educated are less
prejudiced than the less educated. This implies that we have again found support for
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Weil’s suggestions and, as a consequence, we have to refute the hypothesis derived
from religious competition theory, according to which we expected that the higher
a country’s degree of religious heterogeneity, the weaker the educational effect
would be.
According to the structural perspective on education, we expected that a
country’s actual ethnic competition would affect the educational effect on ethnic
prejudice. Therefore, we included two characteristics that re ect a country’s actual
ethnic competition: the unemployment rate and the percentage of non-nationals.
We can be very brief concerning this, since neither unemployment rate nor percent-
age of non-nationals affected the strength of the educational effect on ethnic
prejudice. This indicates that the difference between more and less educated people
with respect to their level of ethnic prejudice does not vary according to a country’s
degree of actual ethnic competition.
We have shown that the cultural perspective on education is more fruitful. Our
 ndings suggest that cross-national differences in the educational effect on ethnic
prejudice are determined by cross-national variances in the transmission of tolerant
values through the educational system. The extent to which tolerant values are
transmitted through the educational system is in uenced by certain country charac-
teristics, i.e. the democratic tradition and the degree of religious heterogeneity. In
longstanding democracies and in religiously heterogeneous countries the educational
effect on ethnic prejudice is strong, whereas in recent democracies and religiously
homogeneous countries the educational effect is rather weak. We found evidence
that in longstanding democracies and in religiously heterogeneous societies more
tolerant values seem to have been transmitted through the educational system than
in recent democracies or religiously homogeneous societies.
NOTES
[1] Although education is often considered to be a determinant of ethnic prejudice in (cross-national)
studies, there have been hardly any studies that focussed speci cally on the relationship between
education and ethnic prejudice in a cross-national perspective. These studies mostly refer to
previous cross-national research on values that are related to ethnic prejudice, such as anti-Semitism
and anti-democratic values.
[2] For instance, the elite or communal leaders have (in)formal contacts with those who are in charge
of the national education programme and who decide what is to be learned at school.
[3] Weil (1985) did not use the term interrupted democracies, as he distinguished only between recent
and longstanding democracies, as his data stem from 1959–1982. In those days the, what we call,
interrupted democracies had as yet only a short democratic tradition. Moreover, the, what we call,
recent democracies (former state socialism societies) were not yet democracies.
[4] At the individual level, actual ethnic competition is determined by the fact that the less educated
have to compete more than average with ethnic minorities, since ethnic minorities more often have
a low level of education (Kiehl & Werner, 1998). As a consequence, the less educated will be more
prejudiced against ethnic minorities.
[5] This procedure provides a more direct test of the nature of the relationship than other procedures
involving modelling of church attendance, which would allow for a wide variety of different but, in
any case, arbitrary categorizations: Hood et al. (1996) ascertain that there is simply no agreement
in the literature in this respect. Still, we also tried several models in order to test the robustness of
our solution.
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[6] Including other individual characteristics as control variables does not affect these cross-national
variances in the strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice: by including them we get the
same parameters.
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APPENDIX. COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
TABLE AI. Country characteristics
Democratic Religious Unemployment Percentage non-
Tradition heterogeneitya rateb nationalsc
Belgium Longstanding 0.60 9.3 9.1
Denmark Longstanding 0.27 7.0 3.8
Finland Longstanding 0.36 17.0 1.2
Great Britain Longstanding 0.76 8.6 3.4
Hungary Recent 0.72 10.2 1.3
Italy Interrupted 0.38 12.0 1.6
The Netherlands Longstanding 0.70 7.1 5.0
Norway Longstanding 0.25 4.9 3.8
Poland Recent 0.15 13.3 4.0
Portugal Interrupted 0.45 5.5 1.6
Sweden Longstanding 0.32 7.7 6.1
aReligious heterogeneity is measured by the diversity index which takes the number of denominations in
a country into account. In the formula (1 2 sum (xn2))/1 2 1/k), where, x represents the different
proportions of denominations and k is the number of denominations. Source, Religious and Moral
Pluralism data.
bTotal unemployment rate in 1995. Source, International Labour Of ce (1998), data for Portugal and
Sweden, International Labour Of ce (1996).
cPercentage of non-national citizens in 1995 (related to the total population). Source, OECD (1998); for
Hungary and Poland, Hagendoorn et al. (1995).
